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EFFECT OF STATE COURT DECREES IN FEDERAL TAX
LITIGATION: A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
The 1934 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Freuler v. Helver-
ing created a controversy as yet unresolved. 2 The issue in the Freuler case
was the effect of a decree of a California state court purportedly resolving
a property dispute affecting federal tax liability. The state court had deter-
mined that income paid to life beneficiaries under a trust properly should have
been reserved to remaindermen as a depreciation allowance. Prior to this
adjudication, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had issued a deficiency
notice to a life beneficiary for failing to include the allowance as income in her
federal tax returns. 3 While the taxpayer's appeal was pending before the Board
of Tax Appeals, the California decision was handed down. The Board consid-
ered itself bound by the state court judgment and therefore precluded from
making an independent investigation of the property issue. Accordingly, it re-
versed the Commissioner.4 However, upon the Commissioner's appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that "no orders of the probate court, the effect of which
would relate to what are deductions to be allowed under the national income
taxing law, are conclusive and binding on the federal courts...."5
On appeal, the Supreme Court characterized the order of the probate court
as an order governing distribution within section 219 of the Revenue Act6 and
rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that it could not control the federal courts.
The Commissioner then argued that the state court judgment did not repre-
sent "an actual adjudication of the question involved." 7 Rather, the decree
was "nothing more than a friendly settlement without any real contest, [re-
quiring] the inference that the primary, if not the sole, object of the proceeding
was to establish a basis for a deduction of depreciation for Federal income
tax purposes." 8 The Commissioner concluded that the California judgment,
"collusively" obtained, fell without the category of state court decisions that
must be followed by the federal courts in subsequent tax litigation.9
1291 U.S. 35 (1934). Justices Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone dissented but accepted the
majority finding on the issue which will be discussed in this paper.
2 See Northwest Security Nat'!l Bank v. Welsh, 203 F. Supp. 263 (D.S.D. 1962).
3 The deficiency was determined under the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 291, 42 Stat.
246. The current comparable section is INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 641.
4 Marguerite T. Whitcomb, 22 B.T.A. 188 (1931).
5 Commissioner v. Freuler, 62 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1933).
6 Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 43 (1934).
7 Brief for Respondent, p. 34, Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
8 Id., pp. 34-35.
9 Fidelity & Clumbia Trust CO. v. Lucas, 52 F.2d 298, (W.D. Ky. 1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 66 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1933).
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The Court accepted the government's position that a collusive state court
decree would not bind the federal courts and defined a collusive proceeding
as one in which "all the parties joined in a submission of the issues and sought
a decision which would adversely affect the Government's right to additional
income tax." 10 The problem of distinguishing collusive from regular proceed-
ings was thus squarely presented.
However the Supreme Court held that the California proceedings were not
collusive. The Court noted that: the state proceeding was usual," the probate
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter,12 notice was given to all inter-
ested parties,13 objection to the account by the remaindermen provided the
basis for deciding the tax issue,14 all parties were represented by counsel,' 5
and the decree was not "in any sense a consent decree."1 6 Although some
ombination of these actors compelled the conclusion that the state judgment
bound the federal courts, 17 the Court made no attempt to assign evidentiary
weight to the several factors noted, to define collusion or to indicate the
policy reasons why collusively obtained judgments were excluded. As a result,
Freuler was a decision on the facts which could give little guidance to lower
courts when the factual situation differed.
Two years later, in Blair v. Commissioner,'5 the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to resolve these ambiguities. The question in the Blair case in-
volved the petitioner's right to assign income he received as a life beneficiary
under a trust. In prior tax litigation, the Commissioner had argued that the
trust in question was a spendthrift trust, with the result that the assign-
ments were invalid and the income taxable to the petitioner. The circuit court,
deciding the issue under Illinois law, found for the government after contested
proceedings.19 Since the decision fixed Blair's tax liability only for the year
1923, he turned to the Illinois courts for favorable construction of the trust
for subsequent tax purposes.
After obtaining a state appellate court judgment that the instrument was not
10 Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. at 45.
11 Ibid. The required trustee's account had been filed. 14 Ibid.
12 Id. at 38. Is Ibid.
13 Id. at 45. 16 Ibid.
17 The Court did not, however, mention certain factors noted by the Commissioner in
his brief: that the "account" was the first rendered in more than twenty-five years and was
filed during the pendency of the tax proceeding; that the answer of the remaindermen was
fied two days after the filing of the account, although the remaindermen were resident in
France; and that the account contained no information other than a statement of the aggre-
gate of receipts and expenditures for each year. Brief for Respondent, p. 35, Freuler v.
Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
18 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
19 Commissioner v. Blair, 60 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 602 (1933).
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a spendthrift trust,2 0 Blair disputed the Commissioner's assessment for the
years 1924-1926 and 1929. The Board of Tax Appeals held that it was bound
by the state decision intervening between the earlier federal litigation 2' and
the controversy before it.22 It was, however, reversed on other grounds by the
Seventh Circuit. 23 The taxpayer's appeal to the Supreme Court gave the
Commissioner the opportunity to present the argument, overruled below, that
the state court proceedings were collusive.24 The Court ignored this chance
to clarify the subject and dismissed the contention on the authority of Freuler.25
The opinion reiterated certain of the determinative factors in Freuler, adding
that the Illinois court was aware of the prior tax proceedings. 26 Again, the
Court failed to discuss policy issues or precisely to define "collusion." 27
Although lacking in guidance, Freuler and Blair are the final words of the
Court.28 The circuits were informed that a decision by a state court of com-
20 Blair v. Linn, 274 Ill. App. 23 (1934). It is strongly suggested by one commentator that
this state proceeding was merely of "surface regularity." Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the
Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions, 51 YALE L.J. 783 (1942). See also Colowick,
The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a Subsequent Federal Income Tax Case,
12 TAX L. Rv. 213, 234 (1957).
21 Commissioner v. Blair, 60 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 602 (1933).
22 Edward T. Blair, 31 B.T.A. 1192 (1935).
23 Commissioner v. Blair, 83 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1936). Although the court felt itself
bound by the state decree, it went on to hold that the taxpayer's interest was limited to
income and did not attach to the corpus of the estate. His interest could not, therefore, be
transferred, and the "assignment" was merely petitioner's "direction to the trustees to pay
[to the assignees], out of the income due to him, various specified amounts each year." Id.
at 662. (Emphasis in original.)
24 "The Government is largely helpless if its revenues are to be put at the mercy of
arrangements substantially interpartes in cases like this one. The Government is never made
a party in submitting these controversies to the state courts; it could not be made a party.
As a matter of fact, it is not ordinarily even notified of the proceeding. In the proceeding
before the Illinois courts... there was no real dispute between the parties-the present
petitioner and his assignees. They were in complete accord and agreement. So far as the
parties to the case were concerned, the issue was largely feigned and moot. It was the Gov-
ernment's interest which was substantially affected by the decision, and yet the Government
had no day in court, no opportunity to present the arguments opposed to those advanced
by the parties before the ourt.... Unless the Government's rights in these cases are to be
put at the mercy of decisions had without allowing it a hearing, the state court decree in
this case should not be a given conclusive effect." Brief for Respondent, pp. 19-20, Blair
v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
25 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. at 10. 26 Ibid.
27 See Berger, Tax Consequences of Non-Tax Proceedings, 17 N.Y.U. 7th INsT. ON FD.
TAX 87, 104-05 (1959).
28 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in subsequent collusion cases, in spite of the
increasing discord among the circuit courts. See, e.g., Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d
578 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953); Falk v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 806
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); Consumer-Farmer Milk Cooperative v. Commis-
sioner, 186 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931 (1951); Sharpe v. Commissioner,
107 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 665 (1940).
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petent jurisdiction determines the character of property rights for federal tax
purposes, 29 provided the decision is arrived at in "non-collusive" proceed-
ings.3 0 Since no general rules were formulated, the circuits have been forced to
develop their own criteria to identify collusive proceedings in the state courts.
This situation has resulted in circuit conflict. The First, Fifth, Seventh and
Tenth Circuits usually scrutinize state court decisions and have characterized
as "collusive" or "non-adversary" 3 1 many which superficially meet the tests
of Freuler and Blair.32 The Second, Third and Eighth Circuits have been more
hospitable to state decrees rendered in proceedings of dubious adversary
character. 33 The remaining circuits have not taken an ascertainable stand;
the Ninth Circuit tends to follow the strict, the Fourth and Sixth the liberal
approach.3 4
I. THE CRITERIA IN THm CRcuIr COumTS
Few of the circuits have attempted to reach the central issue, the definition
of collusion.3 5 However, this is a question which should be answered by the
Supreme Court, since ten definitions of collusion are hardly more salutary
than ten conflicting undefined approaches. A more serious problem is that the
circuits have rarely considered the policy reasons for the collusion rule. Yet
conscious analysis of the rationale for the exclusion would reduce, if not
eliminate, the circuit conflict.
The central portion of this study will be concerned with an analysis and
resolution of the several positions of the circuit courts. 36 The analysis will
29 Uterhart v. United States, 240 U.S. 598 (1916).
30 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1936); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45
(1934).
31 The term "non-adversary" has repeatedly been used by the circuits and appears to be
as determinative against binding effect as the term "collusion." But cf Gallagher v. Smith,
223 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1955); Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944).
Clear distinction between the two terms has not been drawn, but it is arguable that a proper
approach would consider non-adversary proceedings to be of great evidentiary weight in
determining the existence of collusion.
32 E.g., In re Sweet's Estate, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956); Channing v. Hassett, 200
F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1952); Loggie v. Thomas, 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); Brainard v. Com-
missioner, 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937).
33 E.g., Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1955); Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner,
168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948); Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944).
34 E.g., Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955); Newman v. Commissioner, 222
F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955); Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953).
The issue is never presented in the District of Columbia Circuit where property rights are
adjudicated according to federal law.
35 But see Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1952), where the court
defined a collusive proceeding as one in which "there was no genuine issue of law or fact...
and no bonafide controversy between the [parties] as to property rights."
36 No attempt will be made here to deal with two related questions: (1) The reasons why
state court judgments should have any effect on subsequent tax proceedings; the validity
of the Uterhart rule is here assumed. But see Berger, supra note 27, at 104, where the author
states that the doctrine may be attributable to an "intention of Congress to have state court
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reveal the difficulty of adjudicating collusion questions without referring to
the end attained by excluding collusively obtained judgments. That end is the
elimination of a device that prevents the Commissioner from presenting his
theory of tax liability to a court. In the confused lines of circuit cases, and
perhaps even in Freuler and Blair,37 taxpayers have been able to frustrate the
Commissioner by pro forma adherence in the state court to the Freuler cri-
teria.38
For example, a beneficiary will seek to have an instrument construed with
favorable tax consequences in a proceeding where he is not opposed by the
Commissioner seeking a construction favorable to the government. To avoid
this confrontation, the taxpayer will petition a state court where he need
only assure that the proceeding looks like a regular proceeding without,
in fact, being a contest. Discussion of the tax problem with other bene-
ficiaries whose interests will be substantially unaffected by the adjudica-
tion is the next step. With their agreement to act as nominal adversaries, the
"controversy" is ready for adjudication. Various procedural trappings, such
as notice, briefs, oral argument and even an appeal, may be employed to
create the flavor of adversary proceedings without presenting the substantive
construction urged by the Commissioner. This fabricated aura of "adverse-
ness" in the state proceedings 39 will usually be sufficient to frustrate the Com-
missioner, since it will be difficult for him to sustain the burden of proving
collusion. 40
decisions accepted" or to the fact that "due process, the Sixteenth Amendment or some other
constitutional provision" requires their acceptance. See also Colowick, supra note 20, at
229, who suggests that there are two reasons for the rule: (a) that the state court has peculiar
knowledge of the local law and that its judgment is deserving of respect as a state court
precedent; and (b) that unfairnesswill result to the taxpayer who is liable for taxes on benefits
that he has not received due to the state court adjudication. But see the author's critique
of these reasons, id. at 229-30. See also Cardozo, supra note 20, at 786, relating the collusion
rule to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). (2) The problems involved in distin-
guishing state court decisions conclusive in the federal courts because they adjudicate prop-
erty rights from those which can have no effect on federal court decisions since they attempt
to adjudicate rights in an area in which Congress has proposed its own criteria of taxability.
See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION § 1.11 (1942), noted in Gallagher v.
Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 221-23 (3rd Cir. 1955).
37 See Cardozo, supra note 20; Colowick, supra note 20.
38 See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra. Berger's article, supra note 27, is, in part,
an intriguing handbook of tax avoidance through procedural placation.
39 The preservation of family harmony among beneficiaries of a family trust will also
induce agreement among parties to a state suit. See Berger, supra note 27, at 105. In Gal-
lagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 225 (3rd Cir. 1955), the Third Circuit stated that the preserva-
tion of family harmony was to be encouraged, and that, therefore, a state suit settled amicably
by family members ought not to be disturbed. See also Bartol v. McGinnes, 185 F. Supp.
659, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
40 Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Helvering v. Rhodes' Estate,
117 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941); Steele v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mont. 1956).
But cf. Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1952), for a minority view
placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer.
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Such unwarranted results are often dictated by the tests which the circuits
have developed from Freuler and Blair. The indicia of collusion developed
from those cases are directed solely to compliance with the procedural formali-
ties of adversary proceedings. There is, however, no logical inference from the
fact that procedural requirements have been met to a conclusion that the
substantive issue has been argued on its merits.
The basis of circuit conflict is, for the most part, a difference of opinion
about the effect of various procedures, since the courts have failed to ask
whether substantive issues have in fact been argued.41 A discussion of the
criteria developed by the circuits will show this. The circuit cases may be
separated into those concerned with each of four circumstances: (1) the
non-binding character of certain types of state proceedings; (2) the juris-
diction of the state court; (3) the actions of the parties before the state court;
(4) the holding of the state court itself.
A. Nature of the State Proceedings
The circuits have often indicated that judgments rendered in certain types
of proceedings cannot under any circumstances bind the federal courts. Re-
fusal to honor such decrees is based on a doubt that the judgment is the result
of the regular submission of issues. 42
All agree that consent decrees do not bind the federal courts in tax proceed-
ings.43 The consent decree merely gives judicial fiat to a contractual arrange-
ment among the parties.44
Greater controversy exists as to state judgments said to be "in the nature
of... consent decree[s]." 45 This is apparently the result of the circuits' charac-
41 But see Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1955) and Eisenmenger v. Commis-
sioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944), for an interpretation of the collusion issue that does
go to the heart of the matter. These two circuits apparently will not consider any proceeding
to be collusive unless there is a showing of actual fraud. See Colowick, supra note 20, at 233.
42 See, e.g., Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934); Faulkerson v. United States,
301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962); Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131, 136 (9th Cir. 1955);
First Mechanics Nat'1 Bank v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 127, 129-30 (3rd Cir. 1940).
43 E.g., (3rd Cir.) Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (1962); (7th Cir.) Merchants
Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (1957); (10th Cir.) In re Sweet's
Estate, 234 F.2d 401 (1956); (9th Cir.) Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (1955);
(2d Cir.) Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 198 (1948); (8th Cir.) Botz v. Helvering,
134 F.2d 538 (1943).
44 As such, it effectively binds the parties but is not a judicial application of the law
to a case or controversy. See 3 k , JUDGmENTS § 1350 (5th ed. 1925).
45 See, e.g., Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 224 (3rd. Cir. 1955), where the Third
Circuit, on the basis of a doubtful interpretation of Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U..S 297
(1938), held that it was bound by a state judgment in the nature of a consent decree because
it is conclusive of the parties' property rights. Id. at 223. Cf. the reasons given by Colowick
for giving a state court decree binding effect, supra note 36. But cf. Newman v. Commission-
er, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955), where the Ninth Circuit held a judgment not binding
because it was in the nature of a consent decree.
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terizing as a "consent decree" any decree shown to be collusive. Such "consent
decrees" are indistinguishable from the judgments arrived at in superficially
adversary proceedings. Conflict in this area is merely a restatement of conflict
about the proper definition of collusion.
The Seventh Circuit excluded a state court judgment rendered in an ex
parte proceeding in Faulkerson v. United States.4 6 After noting the ex parte
character of the proceeding, the court stated that the lower state court was
one of eighty-four of equal jurisdiction whose decisions do not bind each
other. Furthermore, the decision was contrary to state law and Treasury regu-
lations. The holding is based on a combination of these factors, and it is
difficult to determine whether the ex parte character of the proceeding was
alone sufficient to turn the tide against the taxpayer. This is indicative of the
general problem resulting from failure to assign weight to factors tending to
show collusion.
Arguably, the ex parte nature of the proceeding is sufficient in and of
itself to vitiate use of the judgment. Such proceedings are brought at the
instance and for the benefit of one party without notice to persons having
adverse interests. An adjudication on the merits is foreclosed by the nature
of the proceeding. It seems that the other circuits would follow the Seventh
in this regard.
The circuits also agree that retroactive or nunc pro tunc decrees are not
binding, but there appear to be two distinct lines of reasoning compelling
this conclusion. The Eighth Circuit, in Straight's Trust v. Commissioner,47
viewed reformation proceedings as a device to lessen the national income tax.
However, the Second Circuit, in Daine v. Commissioner,48 and the Tenth
Circuit, in Sinopoulo v. Jones,49 reasoned that a retroactive decree could not
change the factual situation that had created the tax liability. As Colowick
points out, the latter decisions hold that a "state court may not retroactively
create or destroy rights. ... ,"50 but this line of reasoning is questionable. As
a result of a retroactive judgment there is often a redistribution of taxable
benefits. Moreover, rights are created and destroyed as effectively by a retro-
active judgment as by any other type.Sl
The retroactive proceeding does, however, provide opportunity for a tax-
payer to "manufacture evidence of [his] intentions"52 for purposes of tax
litigation. The crucial issue for the federal courts is whether taxable benefits
have, in fact, been reallocated by the judgment, and, if so, whether the judg-
ment was rendered in a contested proceeding in which the Commissioner's
46 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 887 (1962).
47 245 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1957). 50 Colowick, supra note 20, at 224.
48 168 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1948). 51 Ibid.
49 154 F.2d 648 (lOth Cir. 1946). 52 Id. at 225.
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position was effectively argued and overruled. A nunc pro tunc decree is not,
by its nature, conclusive proof of uncontested litigation.
The circuits also express some confusion as to declaratory judgments. No
case holds that such a judgment is, by its nature, not binding in tax proceed-
ings, but Loggie v. Thomas53 and Sewell v. Commissioner5 4 in the Fifth Circuit
hesitated to follow such decrees, although their reasoning is not obvious. The
Fifth Circuit's doubt is not shared by the Third, which, in Commissioner v.
Thomas Flexible Coupling Co.,55 held a declaratory judgment binding. The
Thomas decision is not the best possible authority since the court also empha-
sized that the judgment had been appealed to the state supreme court.5 6 The
Second Circuit reached a similar result in Consumer-Farmer Milk Cooperative,
Inc. v. Commissioner,5 7 but without giving reasons or citing authority.
A declaratory judgment was recently held binding by a federal district
court in Northwest Security Nat'l Bank v. Welsh,58 because the state statute
authorizing such suits stipulated that they must be based on a justiciable con-
troversy between parties having adverse interests.59 However, compliance with
such statutory terms is not a satisfactory criterion since that alone does not
insure that the precise issue in the tax proceeding was fully contested in the
state court. Conversely, there is no reason why any declaratory judgment
should not be binding regardless of the statutory terms if the issue has been
fully adjudicated with substantial presentation of the Commissioner's position.
B. Jurisdiction of the State Court
The second group of criteria used in the circuit cases concerns the juris-
diction of the state court. According to the Supreme Court, a decree of
a state court of competent jurisdiction, absent proof of collusion, will bind
the federal courts.60 However, the Seventh Circuit appears to have limited this
doctrine. The court, in Brainard v. Commissioner6' and Faulkerson v. United
States,62 refused to honor decrees of lower state courts.6 3 In contrast, the
53 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945).
54 151 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1945). 55 198 F.2d 350 (3rd Cir. 1952).
56 Id. at 354. The court cited Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948),
for the proposition that an appeal makes a suit adversary whatever its nature might have
been at its inception.
57 186 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950). 58 203 F. Supp. 263, 266 (D.S.D. 1962).
59 The statute was the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Section 6 of the Act
gives the court discretionary power to refuse to enter a decree that would not terminate
a controversy.
60Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Uterhart v. United States, 240 U.S. 598
(1916.
6191 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. granted, 302 U.S. 682, dismissed, 303 U.S. 665 (1938).
62 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 887 (1962).
63 In Brainard the state court was one of eighty-four courts of equal jurisdiction and in
Faulkerson, one of approximately one hundred such courts.
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Fourth Circuit, in Pitts v. Hamrick,64 stated that a decision of a probate court
evidenced the law of the state even though no higher court had passed upon
the question.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly indicated whether it favors limiting
the broad doctrine of competent jurisdiction.6 5 However, it is doubtful that
the Seventh Circuit has offered a workable distinction. Since only state su-
preme courts have the final word on matters of state law, the logical conclu-
sion of the Seventh's reasoning is that only decisions of those courts would be
binding. This would not only work undue hardship on parties legitimately
seeking to have property rights adjudicated by a state court, but also is con-
trary to the holding of the Supreme Court.66
C. Actions of Parties Before the State Court
The formal actions of the parties to the state suit supply the basis of the usu-
al criteria developed by the circuits. This was not unexpected after Freuler,
since that case emphasized the various components of regularity in the state
court proceeding.
Although there is general agreement that a semblance of adversary proceed-
ings must be shown,67 this is only the most general of criteria. It is necessary to
look to its component parts to give the test content.
Freuler68 and numerous circuit decisions 69 indicate that notice to all parties
64 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955).
65 The Court granted certiorari in Brainard, but the petition was dismissed on the motion
of the petitioner. 303 U.S. 665 (1938). The Court's most definite statement to date may be
found in Blair; the opinion declared that the fact that the state court was an intermediate
court of appeal did not alter the binding effect of the judgment. Blair v. Commissioner, 300
U.S. 5, 10 (1937).
However, the Seventh Circuit's position seems to require the taking of an appeal at least
to the intermediate level. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Commissioner v. Sharpe,
107 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1939), 309 U.S. 665 (1940), a Third Circuit case holding that an unap-
pealed decision was binding.
66 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937).
67 E.g., Stallworth v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958); In re Sweet's Estate,
234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955); Wolfsen v.
Smyth, 223 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1955); Falk v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1951).
But cf. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1955); Eisenmenger v. Commissioner,
145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944).
68 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
69 See, e.g., Darllngton v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3rd Cir. 1962) (that all parties
were summoned was a factor in denial of collusion); Faulkerson v. United States, 301
F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 887 (1962) (lack of notice in the exparte
proceeding relevant to determination of collusion); Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201
F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953) (notice cited as one of the factors determinative of lack of collusion);
Henricksen v. Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank, 139 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1944) (constructive notice
sufficient where it is authorized). But cf. In re Sweet's Estate, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956)
(notice insufficient to overcome fact that no party so notified contested the taxpayer's
construction of a marital deduction trust); Channing v. Hassett, 200 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1952)
(giving of notice not sufficient to overcome negative factors).
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in interest is desirable. Since the Commissioner is not an interested party, it
is presently unnecessary that he be notified.70 The circuits have properly held
that mere notice to the parties is insufficient to prove that the state proceedings
were adversary. However, the absence of notice should create a strong pre-
sumption against the state decree. It may also be urged that the taxpayer, if
he is aware of an impending tax controversy, should be required to notify the
Commissioner as well as the parties of the pendency of the state suit. The
Commissioner could then choose to present his view to those state courts that
allow permissive intervention;71 or file a brief as amicus curiae; or, if he chose
not to argue, to study the proceedings closely for indications of collusion.72
Representation of the interested parties is akin to notice since it is not con-
clusive of contested litigation,73 and its absence creates a strong presumption
against the regularity of the state decree.74 The presence of all interested parties
should have little significance because the issue relates not to the presence of
the parties but to the issues which they argued.
The filing of briefs, the presentation of oral argument and the contest of
accounts in probate hearings have been frequently cited as indicia of adversary
proceedings.75 However, the Third Circuit by its holding in Gallagher v.
Smith that parties need not occupy adversary positions76 has implied that it
does not consider that such factors are necessary.77 All that Gallagher requires
is an independent state court decision on a fairly presented issue.78 However,
it is difficult to understand how such decisions may be obtained without a
contest. "Fairly presented" implies that both sides are before the court; it
70 Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944).
71 This would confine direct intervention to those states that have followed Rule 24(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In those states, the Commissioner, authorized
to enter state courts to protect the interests of the United States by 16 Stat. 162 (1870),
5 U.S.C. § 316 (1958), could intervene on the ground of a common question of law.
72 In 1947, the Commissioner indicated in a mimeograph that he did not favor inter-
ference in state suits, but he did not take a definite stand against all intervention. Mim.
6134, 4 CCH 1947 STAND. FED. TAX RmP. § 6137. A policy of intervention would, of course,
create a large administrative burden for the Commissioner. See Colowick, supra note 20,
at 232.
73 E.g., In re Sweet's Estate, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956), where duly notified parties
merely entered appearances but did not contest the suit. However, representation has been
cited as a desirable factor, e.g., Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3rd Cir. 1962).
74 E.g., Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
887 (1962).
75 E.g., Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934); Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d
693 (3rd Cir. 1962); Channing v. Hassett, 200 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1952).
76 223 F.2d 218, 225 (3rd Cir. 1955).
77 See also Darlington v. Commissioner, supra note 76. But cf Commissioner v. Childs'
Estate, 147 F.2d 368, 370 (3rd Cir. 1945) (distinguished in Gallagher v. Smith, supra note 76,
at 224).
78 223 F.2d at 225.
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cannot be assumed that judges will independently seek out arguments not
introduced by counsel.
Even those circuits which require briefs, oral argument or contested litiga-
tion have not gotten to the crux of the problem. The content of the briefs
or arguments and not the act of filing or presenting them should concern
the federal courts79 since the basic issue for them is whether the state court
has passed upon the argument which the Commissioner urges in the lat-
er tax proceeding. If the decree is binding even if the state court has not
done so, the Commissioner is deprived of his day in court.80
The Third Circuit, in Falk v. Commissioner,8' and the Eighth Circuit, in
Eisenmenger v. Commissioner,8 2 have considered whether the taxpayer must
familiarize the state court with the pending tax controversy. Neither circuit
has found a duty to inform, but in Falk the court weighed the lack of notice
to the court in deciding that the state judgment was not binding. Conversely,
the Eisenmenger court considered the taxpayer's presentation of the record
and briefs of prior tax proceedings among the factors pointing to regularity.
Imposing a duty to familiarize the court with the tax controversy would tend
to assure consideration of the merits of the tax issue. Furthermore, it would
not burden the litigant who seeks a full adjudication of his rights.
The circuits do not agree about the effect of an unappealed decision. For
example, in Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,8 3 the First Circuit
indicated by dicta that it might be bound by an unappealed probate court
decree, although it had previously stated in Channing v. Hassett8 4 that the lack
of an appeal was evidence of a collusive proceeding. Sharpe v. Commissioner8S
and Goodwin v. Commissioner8 6 take the contrary view and hold unappealed
decisions binding.87 The First Circuit position seems more reasonable since
it does not automatically eliminate from consideration all unappealed judg-
ments, but rather finds in them a rebuttable presumption of irregularity. This
brings the factor to the evidentiary level where it belongs.
A unique position was taken by the Second Circuit in Kelly's Trust v.
Commissioner.88 The court there stated that the taking of an appeal is conclu-
sive proof that the state proceeding was adversary. This is a wholly unwar-
79 The Third Circuit is, therefore, clearly correct in saying that these factors are no more
than evidentiary. Ibid.
80 See Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions, 51
YALE L.J. 783, 786 (1942).
81189 F.2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1951). 83 228 F.2d 772, 773 (1st Cir. 1956).
82 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944). 84 200 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1952).
85 107 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 665 (1940).
86 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953).
87 See also Mappes v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Stackpole v.
Granger, 136 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
88 168 F.2dl'198 (2d Cir. 1948).
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ranted conclusion. There is no reason why an appeal is any less likely to be
pro forma than the original litigation,8 9 especially if the taxpayer will still
profit when the costs of the appeal are deducted from his eventual tax saving.
D. Content of the State Court Holding
The circuits have given some consideration to the substance of the state
court decision. There is no difficulty in deciding that the state judgment is not
binding when the issue in the tax controversy has clearly not been adjudicated.
In Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,90 for example, the First
Circuit found that the Massachusetts probate court had merely announced a
general principle of law applicable in the absence of facts pointing to a
contrary result. The existence of such facts, however, constituted the issue
in the tax controversy. Holdings that the state court never met the crucial
issue also can be found in the Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits. 91
These decisions are correct, and it is unfortunate that they occur only in
the clearest cases, since the taxpayer is usually clever enough to put the sem-
blance of an issue before the state court.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR RmsED CRm A
This brief summary of the work of the circuit courts reveals a good deal
of confusion and misdirection.92 In 1962, a federal district court, presented
with the government's contention that a state court decree was collusively
obtained, "admit[ted] to considerable uncertainty as to the present state of
the law." 93 Nevertheless, this uncertainty will not be resolved until the courts
seriously consider the reason why decrees obtained by collusion are not con-
clusive in subsequent tax litigation. It is merely circular to argue that such
judgments are not binding because they are non-adversary. The true reason
for the collusion rule is the impropriety of preventing the government from
presenting its theory to a court. Thus, only an adjudication on the merits will
satisfy the collusion rule.
The simplest method of assuring a contest in tax cases is to exclude all state
court judgments purporting to fix property rights affecting federal tax liability,
although the Supreme Court has refused to accept this alternative. 94 Therefore,
89 Thomas Flexible Coupling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 802, 823 (1950) (dissent).
90 228 F.2d 772 (ist Cir. 1956).
91 Keating v. Mayer, 236 F.2d 478 (3rd Cir. 1956); Burton v. Bowers, 172 F.2d 429 (4th
Cir. 1949); United States v. Mitchell, 74 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1934).
92 See 1 PAuL, FDE.AL ESrATE AND GIFt TAXATION § 1.11 (1942).
93 Northwest Security Nat'l Bank v. Welsh, 203 F. Supp. 263, 265 (D.S.D. 1962).
94 Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934); Uterhart v. United States, 240 U.S. 598
(1916). Writers have also suggested that such a policy would work an undue hardship on
taxpayers who legitimately seek to have their interest adjudicated by a state court and that
there may be constitutional issues involved. See Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State
Court's Decision in a Subsequent Federal Income Tax Case, 12 TAX L. Rav. 213, 234 (1957);
and note 36 supra.
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it cannot be assured that the Commissioner will be able to present his own
argument to a court. The collusion rule should be implemented in such a way
as to avoid this anomalous situation.
If a taxpayer, intending to avoid tax liability,95 institutes a state suit, and
if no interested party presents the argument urged by the Commissioner, then
the state court judgment should be considered to have been collusively ob-
tained.96 It is apparent that many of the criteria developed by the circuits
could still be utilized if this view of the rule were taken, but a change of
emphasis would be required. Representation of and argument by all interested
parties should carry little weight themselves; rather, the interests which the
parties represented, and the arguments they urged, as evidenced in the record
of the state proceedings, should determine the decision of the federal court.
Similarly, state court awareness of the tax controversy should be a factor
only insofar as that awareness is followed by full consideration of the issue.
State proceedings which are, by their nature, inconsistent with the existence
of contested litigation should be denied conclusiveness. This does not depart
from the current position on consent decrees and exparte proceedings. How-
ever, declaratory judgments and nunc pro tunc decrees should be excluded
only if they are not contests on the merits. Taxpayers have the right to seek
to have tax disputes settled in their favor, but the manner in which they do so
must be scrutinized.
Certain innovations could assist the federal courts. Requiring taxpayers
to acquaint the state court with the pendency of tax proceedings and to notify
the Commissioner of the institution of the state suit97 might narrow the pres-
ent scope for collusive tactics. An even more important innovation would
shift the burden of proof on the collusion issue from the government to the
taxpayer.9 8 Shifting the burden of proof would, however, require departure
from the established doctrine that state court proceedings are presumed to be
regular. It might be argued that a change in the law would deny state courts
95 The intent to avoid tax liability is a necessary component of collusion if that term
is to retain its ordinary meaning. This raises a problem where the requisite intent is lacklng
but the state decree does not, in fact, reflect an adjudication of the tax issue on its merits.
Is such a decree to be honored by the federal court because of respect due to the state court?
Or are the policy scales to be tipped in favor of the Commissioner? Freuler and Blair,
strictly construed, would require that the respect due the state court be vindicated in this
case.
96 This conclusion should follow even if an adverse argument other than the Commission-
er's is presented.
97 The most appropriate manner by which this duty might be imposed is through the
Treasury Regulations. A statement by the circuit courts that failure to acquaint the state
court with the tax controversy is evidence tending to show collusion would undoubtedly
also produce the desired effect. More dubious is the possibility of legislative enactment of
such a requirement as an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code.
98 See PAuL, op. cit. supra note 92, at 81; Berger, Tax Consequences of Non-Tax Proceed-
ings, 17 N.Y.U. 7TH INsT. ON FED. TAX 87, 115 (1959).
19631
582 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
due respect. However, the respect presently accorded them derogates from
that due to a department of the federal government. 99 The problem of tax
avoidance by use of state decrees is probably sufficient to weight the scales
in favor of the government, since the taxpayer's intent to deprive the national
government of revenue through collusive proceedings shows disrespect for
both the national government and the state court.
The suggestions offered here do not require radical departure from the
current practice of the circuit courts. In most cases, only conscious adherence
to the proposition that "the best test of the correctness of a decision is its
ability to withstand attack by those adversely affected by it" 00 is required
to reform this area of present uncertainty.
99 A similar conflict occurs where the state decree does not show fraudulent intent but
nevertheless fails as an adjudication on the merits. See note 96 supra.
10D Cardozo, supra note 80, at 795.
